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Introduction 
It is a great privilege to be introduced by Ignacio Arcaya, Venezuelan 
ambassador to the Court of St. James. An Ambassador's job is not an easy one. 
The task is made easier, however, if the Ambassador concerned understands the 
country in which he is living. Ambassador Arcaya has an unrivalled appreciation 
of Great Britain and the British and that is one of the reasons why I was so 
delighted to be invited to give this first Andres Bello Lecture tonight. 
The other reason is my deep respect for Andres Bello whose long association 
with both London and education makes him a particularly appealing character 
for a Professor of London University. Furthermore, I think Bello would have 
approved of the title of this lecture - a lecture that threatens to stray across at 
least four disciplinary boundaries (economics, political economy, economic 
history and political science). Indeed, Bello might even have regarded the 
subject as too narrow in view of the following quotation from Miguel Luis 
Amunategui's biography of the great man. Referring to the Reportorio 
Americano edited by Bello in London in 1826/7, he wrote1: 
'Don Andres Bello also wrote a section entitled Miscellaneous, which 
included short articles on telescopes, steam, blood, the magnetic needle, kidney 
stones, river navigation, meteorology, digestion, the source of platinum, the 
poisonous honey of Uruguay, wild men, the origin of cassava, the rattlesnake, 
the cultivation of coffee in Arabia, the milk tree, the falls of the Vinagre River, 
the chemical analysis of the milk of the cow tree.... the shape of the earth.... the 
cure for yellow fever, rain and floods in the Canary Islands.' 
The subject of my lecture is the state, the market and elections in Latin 
America. All three are linked, although the relationships are not always clear 
or properly understood. Markets can function without a state, but only at the 
most 'micro' level. The most important markets - for labour, capital, foreign 
exchange and technology - nearly always involve the state in one form or 
another. Similarly, a state without a market is a rare and unappealing prospect: 
even Cuba has found that markets play a vital role in bringing supply and 
demand into line. Finally, elections constitute a political market place through 
which state power may be transferred without the need for violence. The 
electoral process is increasingly the arena in which different views of the state 
and the market must be contested. 
An Overview 
Since the middle of the 1980s Latin America has been engaged in a major 
process of economic transformation that has only one parallel this century - the 
1930s.2 Then, however, the region was turning inwards whereas now it is 
turning outwards. Latin America is also in the middle of a major political 
transformation. This means that both these transformations are taking place at 
the same moment, the first time this century that the economic and political 
cycles have fully coincided.3 This has some advantages, but it has many 
disadvantages because the agenda has become very complex and at times 
extremely difficult to manage. 
How much has really changed? At one level the answer must be a great deal. 
The state, for example, has withdrawn from production in most countries or is 
in the process of doing so.4 Sectors regarded as too sensitive for private sector 
investment are now very few5 and probably fewer on average than in Western 
Europe. The state no longer intervenes so persistently in setting prices, whether 
through overt price controls or through manipulation of instruments such as 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the Latin American state has not yet retreated 
behind the cynical trade policy of many developed countries that preach market 
forces and then employ restrictive trade practices.6 The state is also embarked 
on a complex process of decentralisation whose final destiny is still unclear, but 
which in principle could deliver greater accountability and efficiency in the 
future. 
There has also been an explosion in the electoral calendar, with scarcely a 
month going by without some important electoral contest at the national or sub-
national level. Election day itself tends to be free from serious incident and, 
indeed, many of these contests are conducted in an atmosphere of good humour 
and patience.7 The press has become much less constrained in its editorial 
judgements and the level of analysis of leading editorials has become 
increasingly sophisticated. 
International diplomacy has also altered significantly. Latin American 
governments are no longer seen fighting old battles alongside strange bedfellows 
from revolutionary socialist states. On the contrary, the Latin American voice 
is increasingly heard and welcomed in international meetings dealing with the 
pressing issues of the day: trade policy, the global environment, the restoration 
of democracy, regional conflicts and so on. 
All this is very positive and for many people the analysis stops there: state 
reform is seen as leading to a market-driven economy and elections to 
democracy. Pick up any of the literature from the financial institutions 
responsible for the transfer of billions of dollars to Latin America and you will 
see this dual equation spelt out in alarming simplicity. Yet it is not sufficent to 
stop the analysis there, as a sophisticated audience such as this will know all too 
well. 
Furthermore, the real question is not how much has really changed. The real 
question is whether Latin America has now removed the obstacles in the path of 
its constituent nations' achieving developed country status.8 Here the situation 
is much more complex and many doubts begin to surface. I shall demonstrate 
this by focusing on a number of problems that need to be resolved as a matter of 
urgency if progress from developing to developed status is to be achieved. 
Problem 1: 
Despite the favourable international context, the growth of real Gross 
Domestic Product is still far too low 
After falling very severely at the beginning of the 1980s, real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per head is now rising (see Figure 1), but with a few exceptions, 
such as Argentina, Chile and Panama, it is not growing fast enough. After a 
decade (1980-90) in which regional GDP per head fell at an annual rate of one 
per cent,9 it is now rising at an annual rate of 1.5 per cent. Thus, the 1980 level 
of GDP per head has still not been reached10 and the gap between living 
standards in Latin America and the developed countries is as wide as ever. 
This slow growth is a serious problem and, indeed, a major puzzle. After all, 
the economic reform programme in Latin America began in the middle of the 
1980s. It started with trade liberalisation in Bolivia, Chile and Mexico in 1985, 
with the attempt at inflation stabilisation in Argentina in 1985, Brazil in 1986 
and Mexico at the end of 1987, with a process of privatisation in Chile and 
Mexico that had spread to most of Latin America by the end of the 1980s. It is 
not something which began yesterday and it is no longer possible to claim it is 
too early to evaluate because it is only just beginning. The reform programme 
has really been going on for quite a long time.11 
Furthermore, after nearly a decade in which poor performance in Latin 
America was blamed on lack of access to foreign finance, capital inflows to 
Latin America were strong and surprisingly robust in the first half of the 
1990s,12 and should have provided an excellent opportunity to see economic 
performance improve substantially.13 Although there was recession in a number 
of OECD countries until 1994 (notably Germany), the key market for Latin 
America (the United States) has not been in recession and indeed has been 
growing rapidly. Finally, the net barter terms of trade for Latin America, which 
in the 1980s were a source of severe problems, have been recovering since 1993 
with coffee prices in particular rising very fast.14 
Figure 1 
Average Annual Growth Rate (%) of Real GDP per Head, 1991-94 
Source: ECLAC (1994), Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy 
1994, Table A.3, p. 38. 
Problem 2: 
Trade liberalisation is not leading to export-led growth 
Trade liberalisation is implemented through three instruments: the reduction of 
tariffs, the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the corresponding change in the 
real effective exchange rate. What most people focus on are the tariff and the 
non-tariff barrier reductions, and these have been very impressive. Many 
countries have reduced the average level of tariffs to around 10% compared with 
nearer 100% in the mid-1980s and the variation in tariff levels has also declined 
sharply. At the beginning of the process in Latin America these reductions were 
unilateral. When countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico first lowered 
their tariffs, they did not demand in exchange a reduction in tariffs by the United 
States, Europe or Japan; it was all unilateral. Now it is increasingly bilateral or 
multilateral either as a component of regional integration schemes (e.g. MER-
COSUR or NAFTA) or, indeed, as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT.15 
Trade liberalisation has allowed a very substantial increase in imports. Latin 
America's dollar value of imports (f.o.b.) rose from $61 billion in 1985 to $150 
billion in 199316 and is still rising fast.17 If all one is concerned about is being 
able to export to Latin America, it is this that one should focus on: the reduction 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the rapid growth of imports. However, from 
the point of view of Latin America, all of these things are merely instruments 
with the aim of establishing external equilibrium, achieving export-led growth 
and making a contribution to inflation stabilisation. 
Figure 2 
Rate of Growth of Exports of Goods and Services and Real GDP, 1990-93 (%). 1988 dollars 
Source: InterAmerican Development Bank (1994), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 
1994 Report, Tables B- l , p. 239 and B-6, p. 242. 
Among these three objectives, the crucial one is export-led growth. Without 
that, sooner or later the system will go into reverse. Export-led growth implies 
that exports are growing faster than GDP, at least at the beginning of the 
process,18 so that they form the engine of growth for the whole economy. The 
crucial test of export-led growth, therefore, is what is happening to the ratio of 
exports to GDP and it is here that there are serious worries. If we look at the 
data19 since 1990 (see Figure 2) there are eight republics (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) in which the 
rate of growth of exports of goods and services (at constant prices) has been 
slower than the rate of growth of real GDP, implying a fall in the ratio of 
exports to GDP. There are a further four countries (Colombia, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Uruguay) where the rate of growth of exports of goods and 
services (at constant prices) has been below six per cent - the minimum required 
to sustain rapid growth of real GDP per head.20 That leaves only six countries 
(Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador) with 
a satisfactory export performance in the period 1990-93 and questions could 
easily be raised about the long-run sustainability of exports in several of these 
countries.21 
There are many reasons for the relatively poor performance of exports. It can 
be explained in part by the fact that the infrastructure needed to support exports 
is in very poor shape and the investments needed to restore that infrastructure 
have not yet taken place. It is partly a lack of awareness by exporters from Latin 
America about market opportunities; many of them know the US market, but 
they do not know the European or Asian markets so well. And there is still, even 
now, a lot of ignorance about opportunities in neighbouring countries. 
The credit facilities for small and medium-sized firms are also quite 
inadequate. Large firms can borrow on the international markets at relatively 
cheap dollar rates of interest. Small firms cannot and real domestic rates of 
interest are still high even in countries such as Chile. Elsewhere, in countries 
such as Brazil and Venezuela, real interest rates are a serious disincentive for 
exporters and this is made worse when the domestic interest rates are calculated 
in terms of their dollar equivalents.22 
Overriding all this in the last few years, however, has been one problem: the 
real effective exchange rate (REER). This is a measure of the relative value of 
the currency that adjusts the change in the nominal exchange rate for the 
difference between domestic and foreign inflation. When we look at the main 
Latin American countries (see Figure 3), the pattern is clear. Since 1990 there 
has been a tendency for the REER to appreciate, making exporting more 
difficult. 
Real exchange rate appreciation is not necessarily the same as currency 
overvaluation. Sometimes an appreciation of the REER implies overvaluation, 
but not always. Chile, for example, which has had a real appreciation (see 
Figure 2), does not have an overvalued currency; its exports have been growing 
quite strongly and its performance on that score is quite good. Argentina, on the 
other hand, does have an overvalued currency and that is undoubtedly a source 
of concern. 
Figure 3 
Real Effective Exchange Rates, 1990-94 (1990=100) 
a Data for 1994 do not take account of devaluation on and after 20 December. 
Source: ECLAC (1994), Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy 1994 
The appreciation of the REER in Latin America since 1990 is widely 
attributed to the capital inflows that have entered the region. In place of the 
dollar shortage in the 1980s, there has been a dollar surplus that has led to a 
huge rise in net international reserves. Other parts of the world, however, such 
as South-East Asia, have been in receipt of capital inflows without suffering the 
same degree of real currency appreciation. The inability of Latin American 
countries to absorb capital inflows without undermining export competitiveness 
is a major source of concern.23 
Problem 3: 
Macroeconomic reform has not produced international rates of inflation 
Macroeconomic reform has a number of goals, the most important of which is 
price stabilisation. The instruments are well known to us: fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policy. With regard to fiscal policy, it should be said that a great 
deal has been done in Latin America to reform the tax system, to improve the 
efficiency of tax administration, to cut out unnecessary expenditures and so on 
and so forth. A lot more still has to be done, but credit should be given where 
credit is due. Monetary policy has also improved with the elimination of 
negative real interest rates, greater autonomy for central banks and the 
liberalisation of financial markets. 
There are other elements at work in macroeconomic reform, but price 
stability is the key and so a fair test is what has happened to the consumer price 
index in Latin America. Here the news at first sight is very encouraging. If, for 
example, we consider Argentina, Brazil and Peru, the three countries that had 
inflation of more than 1,000 per cent until quite recently, there has been a very 
strong downward trend. In the case of Brazil, the reduction has occurred since 
1 July 1994 with monthly inflation falling from nearly 50 per cent to below two 
per cent. However, inflation rates (see Figure 4) are still far from converging 
on international rates, with a few exceptions. We have to remember that the 
annual average for OECD countries is below four per cent so that only 
Argentina and Panama (see Figure 4) have achieved international rates of 
inflation. 
One should recognise that a great deal has been done in terms of 
macroeconomic reform to stabilise inflation, but then I ask myself how robust 
is it? It may be a cruel question to ask, but it is precisely the other side of the 
coin of the real appreciation of the exchange rate of the last four years. That real 
appreciation, although it has made exporting more difficult, has undoubtedly 
contributed very substantially to the lowering of inflation rates in many Latin 
American countries. Will the inflation stabilisation survive when the real 
exchange rate starts to depreciate again, as it probably will in the next few 
years?24 In a few cases the answer is in the affirmative. Some of these 
stabilisation programmes in Latin America - in Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica, for example - have been well designed and could reasonably be expected 
to absorb a certain degree of real exchange rate depreciation. Yet there are 
others where I have my doubts and one has to say that all the ingredients for a 
really permanent and lasting reduction in inflation are not yet in place.25 
Figure 4 
Annual Inflation Rates (%), 1994 
Note: Figures refer to the Consumer Price Index 
11 The figure for Brazil is the annual rate based on the last six months of 1994. 
Source: Latin American Weekly Report, 26 January 1995, WR-95-03 
Problem 4: 
Microeconomic reform has barely begun and is still incoherent 
Microeconomic reform is extremely complex. We are beginning to know now 
that microeconomic reform is crucial to successful economic performance; the 
studies that the World Bank and other organisations have done of South-East 
Asia have demonstrated this conclusively.26 The trouble is that in Latin America 
there is very little knowledge or understanding of how microeconomic reform 
works best, how to put it in place, which areas should be given priority and so 
on. Each Latin American country is on a learning curve and, with the possible 
exceptions of Chile and Mexico, it is not necessarily a very fast or steep learning 
curve. 
If we look for one single test of microeconomic reform, we can do no better 
than to take the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP for at the end of 
the day there is no better clue to overall economic performance than what is 
happening to investment. This ratio, however, is a major disappointment (see 
Table 1). While in South-East Asia countries regularly invest more than 30 per 
cent of their GDP, in Latin America only Chile comes close to that figure. The 
ratio for other countries is in the range 15 to 25 per cent. 
Table 1 
The Ratio of Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP at current prices (%). 1990-4 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Argentina 14.0 14.6 16.7 18.6 20.7 
Brazil 21.6 19.0 19.1 19.2 20.0 
Chile 26.3 24.5 26.8 28.8 26.5 
Colombia 18.5 16.0 17.2 20.5 21.4 
Mexico 21.9 22.4 23.3 22.2 23.8 
Peru 15.5 16.6 16.6 18.5 23.0 
Uruguay 11.8 12.9 13.4 15.9 15.0 
Venezuela 10.2 18.7 23.2 18.0 15.3 
a Estimate 
Source: Central bank data for each country. 
This unsatisfactory investment performance occurs at a time when capital flows 
to Latin America have been running very strongly. Imports of capital goods -
if the statistics are to be believed - have also been rising very quickly. Indeed, 
it would be difficult to imagine more favourable circumstances for high rates of 
growth of capital formation. Yet the investment ratios in Table 1 are far below 
what is required to establish economic growth on a high and sustainable path.27 
One of the problems with investment in Latin America is that the burden of 
responsibility has now fallen almost exclusively on the private sector. Before 
1982, when Latin America enjoyed investment rates around 25%, the public 
sector was typically responsible for one-third of all investment leaving the 
private sector to invest approximately 16% of GDP. The public sector has now 
withdrawn from many areas of investment for which it previously had 
responsibility and thus a high investment rate requires a transformation in 
investment behaviour by the private sector. This transformation has not yet 
taken place. 
Problem 5: 
Institutions are still weak and institution-building has not received the 
priority it deserves 
Institution-building is a vital part of the reform process. Although much has 
been done to improve the quality of a number of institutions upon which 
economic performance depends, much remains to be done. Take, for example, 
the whole question of property rights, where there are still all sorts of undefined 
areas. Contracts frequently give rise to problems and lead to lengthy disputes 
that have to be settled through the cumbersome judicial process. Very few 
countries can truly boast a genuinely efficient and impartial civil service. 
Institutional deficiencies also prevent the diffusion of technology through the 
whole of the country as opposed to its appropriation by the largest firms. Insider 
trading is still a serious problem in most Latin American stockmarkets, while 
institutions to tackle the problem of the abuse of monopoly power are almost 
non-existent. This is an area where again a lot of learning has to be done before 
the right balance can be struck. 
It would be wrong to end this section of the lecture on a negative note. Where 
all areas of reform - trade liberalisation, macroeconomic, microeconomic and 
institutional - are tackled vigorously and courageously, as in Chile, the results 
can be quite spectacular.28 The incentives for reform certainly exist and the 
rewards are tangible. 
The solutions to the problems outlined above are to be found mainly in Latin 
American hands. The changes needed are clear in some cases, such as trade 
liberalisation and macroeconomic reforms, less clear in others such as 
microeconomic reform and institution-building. Nonetheless, it is in general true 
that the solution lies inside Latin America rather than outside it. 
The Role of the State 
It is at this point that we must address explicitly the role of the state. It is often 
said that the state in Latin America needs to shrink. That is only correct if we 
define the state to include state-owned enterprises - what economists call general 
government. If, however, we refer to the activities of central and local 
goverment, it is not at all clear that the state should shrink. Indeed, measured by 
the ratio of tax income to GDP, the size of the state seems certain to rise in the 
next decade. This is both because the demands on the state are likely to grow and 
also because economic growth will result in a disproportionately rapid rise in tax 
revenue.29 
The issue is therefore not one of size. Instead, it has become common-place 
to talk about the need for efficiency. Yet this is also misleading since the 
efficiency of the state is like motherhood and apple-pie; we are all in favour of 
it and no one would argue for an inefficient state. The real issue is in fact 
whether the state should be neutral or non-neutral in decisions over the 
allocation of resources. 
What is a neutral state? A neutral state is one that encourages domestic prices 
to move as close as possible to international prices and then allows the private 
sector through its investment decisions to determine the allocation of productive 
resources between the different sectors and branches of the economy. The 
state's role is then limited to altering the distribution of those resources through 
a system of transfers. An example of a neutral state is Mexico today, where the 
allocation of resources is by and large determined by the private sector on the 
basis of relative prices that are increasingly in line with those in the United 
States, while the Mexican state uses agencies such as PRONASOL and 
PROCAMPO to carry out a series of income transfers in pursuit of greater 
social welfare. 
A non-neutral state does not mean traditional state intervention, although an 
interventionist state is of course non-neutral. The non-neutral state deliberately 
interferes with relative prices to send signals to the private sector that alter the 
allocation of resources from what would take place under a neutral regime. The 
non-neutral state, for example, might subsidise credit for small firms in order 
to compensate the disadvantages such firms often face in competition with large 
firms. An example of a non-neutral state in Latin America is Brazil, where 
relative prices are still heavily influenced by the allocation of resources desired 
by the authorities. 
Both kinds of state have their advantages and disadvantages. In Latin 
America, however, there is a special problem. This is because the ideology of 
neo-liberalism favours a neutral state, while tradition and the lessons of 
economic history favour a non-neutral state. This frequently causes confusion 
and even incoherence. The Chilean state, for example, is in the process of 
moving from neutrality to non-neutrality, but it is obliged to do so within an 
ideological context that favours neutrality. Argentina is ostensibly committed to 
neutrality, and aggressively so in terms of rhetoric, but the consequences are in 
some cases deemed unacceptable and elements of non-neutrality are creeping in 
more and more. 
A further problem arises because a precondition for an efficient non-neutral 
state may well be a neutral state. To move from an orthodox interventionist state 
directly to non-neutrality in the sense discussed here is likely to be very 
dangerous. One can see, for example, that in states such as the Dominican 
Republic or Paraguay, this would simply become a formula for business as 
usual. Indeed, even in Brazil it is likely to be a serious problem. The neutral 
state is much more likely to be consistent with an impartial civil service, an 
absence of corruption and administrative efficiency. Yet the lesson of South-
East Asia is surely that fast economic growth and high rates of investment 
require a non-neutral state. This is the dilemma that Latin America faces today. 
Elections 
Latin America is in the middle of a complex political transformation and much 
of the news is very encouraging. There are frequent elections. Brazil, for 
example, went to the polls in early October with an electorate of 95 million 
people. A very festive atmosphere seems to have ruled and few cases of 
misdoings were reported.30 
A peaceful transfer of power has been observed in many Latin American 
countries in recent years. Even Venezuela, for example, was able despite all its 
problems to transfer power at the beginning of 1994 from one party to another, 
one president to another, without a constitutional crisis. The same has been true 
of many smaller countries where a peaceful transfer of power from one civilian 
to another was until recently exceptional. 
The international context is now much more positive for establishing the 
political process on a sound basis. For example, in the last two or three years 
there have been major political upheavals in a number of countries that could 
easily have destroyed the democratic process: the failed autogolpe in Guatemala, 
the successful one in Peru, the overthrow of President Aristide in Haiti and the 
attempted military coups in Venezuela. Without doubt the response of the 
international community was very positive in bringing each of these countries 
back to the democratic fold in one form or another. 
Another element that is worth stressing as far as good news is concerned is the 
fact that the press is now much freer, and generally of better quality, than it has 
been in the past. It is freer to criticise and it uses that freedom with enthusiasm. 
I cannot yet say the same about television coverage, which is often more 
important than press coverage, but nonetheless the quality of journalism and the 
press has substantially improved in the last ten years. 
Finally, on the good news side, it is interesting and encouraging to note that 
some governments have found that the response to tough economic decisions has 
been a reward from the electorate. In other words, taking tough economic 
decisions does not necessarily mean one is voted out of office; on the contrary, 
as President Menem is likely to find in Argentina, tough economic decisions can 
indeed be rewarded electorally.31 
However, there is another side to this particular coin. Throughout Latin 
America there is now a contempt for political parties and many political 
institutions, such as Congress, the likes of which we have not seen for many 
years. This is very strange when we remember that so many elections are taking 
place in such a relatively free atmosphere. For example, Peru is currently 
preparing for elections in April 1995, with fifteen presidential candidates 
offering themselves to the electorate.32 Most of these candidates are going out 
of their way not to be defined as traditional politicians from traditional parties, 
because to do so would be to destroy their credibility in the eyes of the public. 
This is not a healthy situation. In the end, one does need strong political 
institutions, strong political parties. Without them it is very difficult to see how 
the momentum in favour of political reform can be sustained. 
It is also not true that elections are fair in the way that we would understand 
it in Europe. They are much improved compared with what they were ten or 
fifteen years ago, but even in Brazil the situation leaves something to be desired. 
I spent six weeks in Brazil between July and September 1994 and watched the 
whole electoral process at work. The machinery of government was brought to 
bear in favour of one candidate, in this case Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in a 
way which we in Europe would have to regard as unfair. Of course, Cardoso 
could probably have won even if he had not had the support of this enormous 
machine, backed up by TV, the press and radio. Yet such an observation misses 
the point. The playing field is not yet level and the candidates favoured by the 
elites still have formidable advantages. 
It is also true that the really solid democracies, such as Costa Rica and 
Uruguay, or Chile once again after its long military interlude, are the countries 
that were democracies before. Those countries that were weak democracies, or 
not democracies at all, are still facing a number of problems in terms of 
consolidating the political process and removing the threat of a return to direct 
or indirect military rule. 
If we look at the electoral panorama of the main Latin American countries, 
we find an interesting situation (see Table 2). Not everyone would agree with 
my assessment, but I have tried to show for eight major countries the two parties 
- in the case of Chile the coalition - that have a reasonable chance of winning 
presidential elections today. There is a question mark against the PAN in 
Mexico because I am not sure that that is really a legitimate place to put it. On 
the right-hand side we have the main opposition party which is not yet electable: 
'not yet electable' raises all sorts of questions about what I mean and I will 
define it shortly. However, in all the countries except Chile this 4not yet 
electable' main opposition party is on the left, sometimes very far on the left: 
Frente Grande in Argentina, PT in Brazil, M-19 in Colombia, PRD in Mexico, 
Izquierda Unida in Peru, Encuentro Progresista in Uruguay, Causa-R in 
Venezuela. 
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There are two possibilities why these parties are not yet electable. The first 
is that they may not be very popular. The other possibility is that the electoral 
process works against them. For the purpose of this lecture it does not really 
matter which of these explanations is true (for other purposes it does). What it 
means is that there is a huge burden of responsibility on those parties that have 
a reasonable chance of winning elections in the next few years to ensure that 
economic growth accelerates, and that the benefits of that economic growth are 
reasonably and fairly distributed. That is easy to say, it is much more difficult 
to achieve. 
It is crucial that this happens whichever interpretation we put on the non-
electability of the parties listed to the right of Table 2. For example, suppose 
they are not being elected because they are not yet popular. They will certainly 
become more popular if the reform process in Latin America fails to deliver the 
economic growth and the distribution of benefits in a way that people regard as 
fair, and it will certainly be problematic if they are not being elected because 
they are being disadvantaged by the electoral process. They will not stay inside 
the electoral process for ever if they feel that the machinery is being used against 
them. 
The next five years are crucial. In a sense it is a wonderful opportunity for 
those parties that have a reasonable chance of forming governments; they have 
in front of them a reform process that can, under the right circumstances, offer 
widespread economic advantages. Where the reform process does so, there is 
every reason to believe that when - perhaps in a few years time - one of the 
other parties is elected, it will be unwilling to undermine what has been achieved 
in the past. That is the challenge that Latin America faces today. 
Conclusions 
It would be very surprising if the economic and political transformations in Latin 
America in the last decade had produced a smooth transition towards economic 
prosperity and political stability. Instead, we observe a patchwork where almost 
all countries can take pride in their progress in some areas, while no country -
not even Chile - can yet be fully assured of long-run success and a swift 
transition to developed country status. I want to end, therefore, with a series of 
conclusions that put the story in proper perspective. 
First, the process of trade liberalisation is now irreversible and this will 
eventually lead to more competitive markets and greater choice for consumers. 
However, the high levels of concentration of economic activity in Latin America 
will place limits on the degree of competition in the domestic market and this 
will make it very difficult to achieve international rates of inflation. 
Secondly, reform of the state will continue and economic growth - even if 
modest - will generate additional resources for the public sector. These can be 
used either directly to alleviate social tensions (e.g. PRONASOL in Mexico) or 
indirectly by encouraging the growth of small, labour-intensive firms. Either 
way, poverty will decline in Latin America, although the impact of economic 
growth on income distribution is much more uncertain. 
Thirdly, the neutral state will cease to be a major objective and non-neutrality 
will become intellectually and ideologically respectable. Only in a few 
countries, however, will this non-neutrality be achieved by a truly impartial 
state. Thus, non-neutrality will go hand in hand with a continuation of 
corruption by public officials and rent-seeking by private sector agents with 
periodic attempts at greater transparency and accountability by members of the 
economic and political elites. 
Fourthly, elections are here to stay and will become more contested as the 
main opposition parties become better at using modern electoral techniques. 
Non-party politicians will do well at local level, capitalising on the widespread 
disillusionment with traditional party politics, but will not be able to win the 
Presidency and other national prizes. 
Finally, the real test of liberal democracy will come, just as it did in Europe, 
when economic and social elites have to live with governments whose 
programmes do not favour their interests. Elite responses will in large part 
determine the future of Latin American democracy. That test has yet to be 
faced. The experience of the past is not encouraging, but the younger generation 
of elites is not the same as its predecessors. Globalisation, trade liberalisation 
and education have all altered their perceptions and the prospects for Latin 
America are, in that sense, much healthier. 
Notes 
1. See Caldera (1977), pp. 50-1. 
2. An account of economic reform in Latin America in the 1930s and 1980s can 
be found in Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Chapters 7 and 11. 
3. They coincided in the last century in the 1820s at the time of independence. 
This is not a happy precedent, however, as the outcome was little short of 
disastrous. See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Chapter 2. 
4. In those countries, such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, where popular 
support for privatisation is weak, ingenious methods have had to be used by 
governments to divest state-owned enterprises. In the case of Bolivia, where the 
process is known as capitalisation, see the Financial Times Supplement, 9 
November, 1994. 
5. Examples are the oil industry in Mexico and Venezuela, dominated by 
PEMEX and PDVSA respectively, and the copper industry in Chile, where 
CODELCO remains a major force. Even in these cases, however, the private 
sector is increasingly being allowed to play a role. 
6. All comparative studies of non-tariff barriers, such as Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERs), concur that the worst offenders are developed countries. 
See, for example, Winters (1991), Chapters 10 and 11. 
7. As a member of an international delegation of observers to the Panamanian 
elections in May, 1994, I was able to see this at first hand. Delays that might 
have been regarded as intolerable in Western Europe or the United States were 
accepted with remarkable stoicism and even amusement. 
8. There is some dispute over the circumstances under which a developing 
country becomes developed. The World Bank currently regards an income per 
head of $10,000 as the dividing line. The highest income levels in Latin 
America are still some way below. See World Bank (1994), Table 1, pp. 162-3. 
9. See Inter-American Development Bank (1994), Statistical Appendix, Table 
B-2. 
10. Real GDP per head in 1994 was still 2.4 per cent below its level in 1980. See 
ECLAC (1994), Table A.l , p. 37. 
11. This is particularly true of Chile where the economic reform programme 
could be said to have started in 1974 following the overthrow of the Allende 
government and the imposition of the Pinochet dictatorship. See Bosworth, 
Dornbusch and Laban (1994), Chapter 1. 
12. Most commentators were surprised by the ability of Latin America in 
general and Mexico in particular to capture foreign sources of finance in the 
wake of the Chiapas rebellion and the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio. 
After a slight pause in the second quarter of 1994, capital was again attracted 
to the region in the second half of the year although total portfolio investment 
did decline. See World Bank (1994a), p. 204. 
13. After a negative net transfer of resources (i.e. net capital flows to Latin 
America below interest payments and profit remittances) between 1982 and 
1990, the net transfer of resources turned positive in 1991 and has remained 
positive subsequently. In 1994 net capital inflows are estimated at $56.6 billion 
compared with $65.1 billion in 1993. See ECLAC (1994), p. 52. 
14. See ECLAC (1994), pp. 47-8. 
15. Virtually all Latin American countries are involved in one regional 
integration scheme and some are involved in several. Mexico, for example, in 
addition to being a member of NAFTA, has free trade agreements with Chile, 
Colombia and Venezuela, Costa Rica and Bolivia. 
16. See Inter-American Development Bank (1994), Statistical Appendix, Table 
D-4. The reader should note that the source defines Latin America to include 
a number of small Caribbean countries (e.g. Jamaica) and to exclude Cuba. 
17. In 1988, I predicted that imports would double from their 1988 level by the 
year 2000. See Bulmer-Thomas (1989), p.208. That target, regarded by many 
as hopelessly optimistic at the time, has already been passed. 
18. Eventually, export-led growth may be so successful that the non-export 
sector grows as fast or even faster than the export sector. This has happened in 
Japan in the last 20 years. However, rapid growth of exports is needed at the 
beginning of the process both to finance imports and to service the foreign 
capital required to modernise the economy. 
19. The source excludes Cuba. In addition, Haiti has been excluded as both 
exports and GDP were falling. 
20. With population growth at 2 per cent per year, a doubling of living standards 
every 25 years implies GDP growth of 5 per cent per year. This in turn requires 
at least 6 per cent growth of exports in an export-led model. 
21. In the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador, for example, the 
value of exports of goods (excluding services) is virtually unchanged or even 
lower compared with the beginning of the 1980s. See IDB (1994), Table D-3, 
p. 264. 
22. An export firm needs to deflate nominal domestic interest rates by the 
change in the domestic price of exports. This may be much less than the price 
indices normally used to convert nominal interest rates to real rates. 
23. On the differential impact of recent capital inflows on Latin America and 
South-East Asia, see the Economist, 29 October 1994, p. 118. 
24. The huge capital inflows of the last few years can be expected to decline in 
the second half of the 1990s, thereby removing one of the main factors behind 
the recent real exchange rate appreciation. 
25. The acceleration in inflation in Venezuela in 1994, following the sharp 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, is an indication of the sensitivity of 
the price level in many Latin American economies to external shocks. 
26. See, for example, World Bank (1993). 
27. The figures in Table 1 are calculated from current dollar prices for both 
investment and GDP. Since trade liberalisation has lowered the cost of imports 
of capital goods, it is sometimes argued that current price calculations bias 
downwards the investment ratio. However, a large part of investment consists 
of construction and the latter is a non-traded good, whose relative price has 
increased sharply since 1990 as a result of REER appreciation. On the 
measurement of capital formation in Latin America, see the different chapters 
in Bacha (1993). 
28. Since the mid-1980s Chile has enjoyed rapid growth of income and income 
per head. Annual inflation has now fallen to single figures and the unemployment 
rate has averaged five per cent in the last three years. There has been a sharp 
reduction in poverty since 1987 and a more modest improvement in income 
distribution. See Marcel and Solimano (1994). 
29. There is a positive correlation between income per head and the ratio of tax 
revenue to GDP. Developed countries in general have a higher ratio than 
developing countries and richer developing countries a higher ratio than poorer 
countries. The ratio of central government revenue to GDP in Latin America 
currently averages around 20% compared with around 30% in OECD countries. 
See World Bank (1994), Table 11, pp. 182-3. 
30. The worst case was in Rio de Janeiro where the voting process was subject 
to interference by the drug-dealers that hold sway in the favelas. The election in 
the city was therefore rerun on 15 November at the same time as the second 
round ballot. 
31. The most spectacular case of tough economic reform being rewarded by the 
electorate must surely be the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the 
Presidency in Brazil in October 1994. All analysis concurs that the reduction 
in the monthly rate of inflation made possible by the Cardoso Plan was crucial 
in bringing victory. 
32. See Embassy of Peru, Press Release, 24/94, London, p.3. 
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